Expectativas cambiarias, selección adversa y liquidez
Exchange expectations, adverse selection and liquidity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29105/ensayos33.1-2Palabras clave:
Análisis Técnico, Selección Adversa, Expectativas de Tipo de Cambio, Liquidez del Mercado, Diseño de Mecanismos, Préstamos Directos del GobiernoResumen
Este artículo evalúa las implicaciones en el corto plazo de las expectativas cambiarias en mercados de crédito, afectados por problemas de selección adversa, y modela un mercado de crédito donde los contratos de deuda son contingentes en el ingreso de los prestatarios. Los activos riesgosos que estos últimos poseen están denominados en moneda extranjera y su valor en libros, estipulado en los contratos de deuda, se traduce usando las expectativas sobre el tipo de cambio basadas en las premisas del análisis técnico. Este artículo muestra que la información pública, generada por la tendencia adversa del tipo de cambio, mueve al mercado de crédito hacia un equilibrio donde la inversión y el crédito se contraen, y definen el espacio para la intervención del gobierno. En este contexto, el gobierno responde a la información generada por la tendencia del tipo de cambio e incrementa el tamaño de programa, a fin de estabilizar las variaciones en la tasa de interés, lo cual evita que la inversión y la liquidez se reduzcan.
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Derechos de autor 2014 Jimmy Melo
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
