Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Differentiated Goods
Políticas ambientales estratégicas en presencia de bienes diferenciados
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29105/ensayos41.1-3Palabras clave:
Strategic environmental policy, pollution quota, pollution disutility, oligopolistic competition, welfareResumen
We develop a theoretical model of partial equilibrium where firms, located in a country, compete and produce differentiated goods in a duopolistic market. Emission of pollution is related to production, and firms produce their output using different levels of polluting technology. To control pollution emission, the government applies discriminatory pollution quotas considering the benefits for firms, consumers, and environmental damage. The results show that if the disutility to be polluted is very high, the government imposes a zero-emission quota on the companies. But, if such disutility is not significantly high, it allows a certain amount of emissions, imposing different quotas on firms depending on the levels of technology they use to control their emissions. The proposed model stresses the importance of the rational establishment of strategic environmental policies, which benefit all economic agents in the market, firms, consumers, and the environment.
Resumen
Desarrollamos un modelo teórico de equilibrio parcial donde las empresas, ubicadas en un país, compiten y producen bienes diferenciados en un mercado duopolístico. La emisión de contaminación está relacionada con la producción, y las empresas producen utilizando diferentes niveles de tecnología contaminante. Para controlar la emisión de contaminación, el gobierno aplica cuotas de contaminación discriminatorias teniendo en cuenta el beneficio para las empresas, los consumidores y el daño ambiental. Los resultados muestran que si la desutilidad a contaminar es muy alta, el gobierno impone una cuota de cero emisiones a las empresas. Pero, si dicha desutilidad no es significativamente alta, permite una cierta cantidad de emisiones, imponiendo diferentes cuotas a las empresas dependiendo de los niveles de tecnología que utilizan para controlar sus emisiones. El modelo propuesto subraya la importancia del establecimiento racional de políticas ambientales estratégicas, que actúen en beneficio de todos los agentes económicos en el mercado, las empresas, los consumidores y el medio ambiente.Descargas
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Derechos de autor 2021 Rafael Salvador Espinosa Ramírez, Salvador Sandoval
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
