Evasión fiscal en impuestos subnacionales

Hilario Barcelata Chávez

doi:10.29105/ensayos45.2-5

Authors

Hilario Barcelata Chávez Universidad Veracruzana https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0997-8449

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29105/ensayos45.2-5

Keywords:

Tax evasion, payroll tax, wage bill, public finances, informal employment

Abstract

Objective: This study aimed to present a methodology for estimating payroll tax evasion across the Mexican federal entities, particularly that associated with informal employment and its determinants. Methodology: The method was based on the total wage bill of all subordinate and remunerated workers, using primarily quantitative data to estimate tax evasion linked to informal employment. Findings: The results showed that tax evasion was associated with low state tax collection efficiency and informal employment. Implications: The findings highlight the importance of adopting a comprehensive public finance approach to maximize tax revenues and mitigate tax evasion. Originality: The study contributes a methodology for estimating payroll tax evasion in the Mexican federal entities, emphasizing the role of informal employment and its determinants.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Hilario Barcelata Chávez, Universidad Veracruzana

Hilario Barcelata Chávez holds a Ph.D. in Public Finance, an M.A. in Regional Development, and a B.A. in Economics from the Universidad Veracruzana. He is a Full-Time Professor-Researcher at the Faculty of Economics and a Level I National Researcher in Mexico's National System of Researchers (SNII). His research interests include public finance, fiscal federalism, regional economics, economic history, and regional development. He has published books, book chapters, and peer-reviewed scientific articles in national and international journals. He has also presented his research at academic conferences and supervised undergraduate, master's, and doctoral theses. In addition, he has built an extensive career as an analyst of the Mexican economy and public finance through various media outlets.

References

[1] Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3–4), 323–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2

[2] Acconcia, A., D’Amato, M., & Martina, R. (2003). Corruption and tax evasion with competitive bribes (CSEF Working Paper No. 112). Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance, University of Naples Federico II. http://www.csef.it/WP/wp112.pdf

[3] Antón, A. (2014). The effect of payroll taxes on employment and wages under high labor informality. IZA Journal of Labor & Development, 3, Article 20. https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-9020-3-20

[4] Baldry, J. C. (1979). Tax evasion and labour supply. Economics Letters, 3(1), 53–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(79)90070-3

[5] Barcelata Chávez, H. (2012). La evasión del impuesto sobre nóminas en las entidades federativas de México. Revista ICDT, 49(67), 133–162. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BfCJhLPMtGp-LvfFlljhDkWmWturbgRq/view

[6] Barcelata Chávez, H. (2023). Masa salarial y distribución del ingreso subnacional en México. Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF, 18(1), e685. https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v18i1.685

[7] Benzarti, Y., & Harju, J. (2021a). Can payroll tax cuts help firms during recessions? Journal of Public Economics, 200, Article 104472. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104472

[8] Benzarti, Y., & Harju, J. (2021b). Using payroll tax variation to unpack the black box of firm-level production. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(5), 2737–2764. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab010

[9] Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social. (2021, 30 de junio). Nota: Cálculo de los indicadores complementarios al ITLP. Medición de la pobreza. https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/Paginas/ITLP-IS_resultados_a_nivel_nacional.aspx

[10] Cottet, S. (2020). Payroll tax reductions for minimum wage workers: Relative labor cost or cash windfall effects? (PSE Working Paper No. halshs-03010943). Paris School of Economics. https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03010943v1

[11] Daunfeldt, S.-O., Gidehag, A., & Rudholm, N. (2021). How do firms respond to reduced labor costs? Evidence from the 2007 Swedish payroll tax reform. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 21(3), 315–338. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00356-6

[12] Escobari, D. (2012). Imperfect detection of tax evasion in a corrupt tax administration. Public Organization Review, 12(4), 317–330. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-011-0172-5

[13] Flores Curiel, D., Valero Gil, J. N., Chapa Cantú, J. C., & Bedoy Varela, B. (2005). El sector informal en México: Medición y cálculo para la recaudación potencial. Ciencia UANL, 8(4), 490–494. http://eprints.uanl.mx/1642/1/art_recaudacion.pdf

[14] Guillermo Peón, S. B., & Vargas Casimiro, I. (2017). Recaudación potencial, eficiencia recaudatoria y transferencias federales: Un análisis para las entidades federativas en México utilizando el modelo de frontera estocástica. EconoQuantum, 14(1), 35–71. https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v14i1.6541

[15] Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. (2007, 1 de febrero). Glosario de la Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE). https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/glosario/default.html?p=ENOE15

[16] Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. (s. f.). Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE), población de 15 años y más de edad. Recuperado el 20 de mayo de 2025, de https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enoe/15ymas/

[17] Kolm, A.-S., & Larsen, B. (2004). Does tax evasion affect unemployment and educational choice? (Working Paper 2004:4). Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. https://www.ifau.se/en/Research/Publications/Working-papers/2004/Does-tax-evasion-affect-unemployment-and-educational-choice/

[18] Ku, H., Schönberg, U., & Schreiner, R. C. (2020). Do place-based tax incentives create jobs? Journal of Public Economics, 191, Article 104105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104105

[19] Morales, L. F., & Medina, C. (2017). Assessing the effect of payroll taxes on formal employment: The case of the 2012 tax reform in Colombia. Economía, 18(1), 75–124. https://doi.org/10.31389/eco.52

[20] Pencavel, J. H. (1979). A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules. Journal of Public Economics, 12(1), 115–124. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(79)90059-8

[21] Pestieau, P., & Possen, U. M. (1991). Tax evasion and occupational choice. Journal of Public Economics, 45(1), 107–125. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(91)90050-C

[22] Persson, M., & Wissén, P. (1984). Redistributional aspects of tax evasion. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 86(2), 131–149. https://doi.org/10.2307/3439686

[23] Puente, J., & Rodríguez, R. (2011). Estimación del potencial de recaudación de las haciendas locales: Un enfoque de fronteras estocásticas. Finanzas Públicas, 6(3), 279–321. https://www.cefp.gob.mx/publicaciones/revista/2011/fp_v3_n6.pdf

[24] Saez, E., Schoefer, B., & Seim, D. (2019). Payroll taxes, firm behavior, and rent sharing: Evidence from a young workers’ tax cut in Sweden. American Economic Review, 109(5), 1717–1763. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171937

[25] Sandmo, A. (2005). The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view. National Tax Journal, 58(4), 643–663. https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2005.4.02

[26] Scherer, C. (2015). Payroll tax reduction in Brazil: Effects on employment and wages (ISS Working Paper No. 602). International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/77532

[27] Valenzuela-Reynaga, R., & Hinojosa-Cruz, A. V. (2017). Las transferencias federales, los contrapesos políticos y los ingresos fiscales estatales en México. Economía UNAM, 14(42), 47–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eunam.2017.09.002